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The money supply is affected by the interaction of the 
monetary authority, the banKing system, and the public 
[Branson, 1979; Brunner and Meltzer, 1968; Burger and 
Rasche, 1977; Cagan, 1965; Friedman and Schwartz, 1963b; 
Steindl, 1982]. The Federal Reserve can control nonborrowed 
reser~es directly through open marKet operations to affect 
the money supply. It is postulated that a causal 
relati.onship runs primarily from money to income and pr·ices 
rather than in the opposite direction [8arro, 1981c; Cagan, 
1965; Friedman and Schwartz, 1963a; Laidler, 19811. It is 
also suggested that there is a predictable relationship 
betwe~n a change in money growth and a subsequent change in 
GNP growth ~Brunner and Me 1 tzer, 1983J. Monetarists have 
viewed that monetary impulses are a major factor determining 
variations in economic a~tivity [Brunner, 1968; Laidler, 
19811. Accelerations or decelerations of the money supply 
are closely followed by accelerations or decelerations in 
economic activity. It is evident that the behavior of the 
Federal Reserve is related to basic economic goals: full 
employment, economic growth, price stability, and 
equilibrium in the balance of payments. Money marKet 
1 
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conditions are traditionally viewed by the Federal Reserve 
in pursuing its short-run objective of minimizing economic 
fluctuation [HavrilesKy, Sapp, and Schweitzer, 1975; Teigen, 
1969; Wood, 1967]. There exists a simultaneous relationship 
between Federal Reserve behavior and economic activity. 
To monetarists, changes in the money stocK result in 
short-run changes in both nominal and real magnitudes <such 
as output, employment, and real interest rates>, while 
influencing only nominal magnitudes in the long run <such as 
total spending, prices, and marKet interest.ra~es) 
[Friedman, Brunner, Meltzer, Tobin, Davidson, and PatinKin, 
' 
1974; Laidl!r, 1973 and 1981]. Under the rational 
expectations hypothesis, only the unanticipated mooey 
movements ~an have nonneutral effects on real variables 
' 
because random movements in the money supply cannot be 
immediately distinguished from random movements in relative 
demand [Attfield and DucK, 1983; Barro, 1981a, 1981b, and 
1981c; Griffiths and Wood, 1981]. The temporary trade-off 
between inflation and unemployment comes from the 
unanticipated inflation. 
The purpose of this study is to test the pol i~Y 
ineffectiveness proposition--systematic pol icy cannot affect 
real variables in the short run and long run--empirically. 
In previous studies, the money supply has been generally 
used as the exogenous variable to test the effects of 
monetary actions·on certain strategic economic variables 
[Andersen and.Carlson, 1970; BeenstocK and DicKs, 1983]. In 
3 
the Fair model [1976], the value of government securities 
outstanding is used as a monetary pol icy variable controlled 
by the Federal Reserve. However, the money supply or the 
behavior of the Federal Reserve can have both exogenous and 
endogenous dimensions. In this study, the exogenous 
determinants of nonborrowed reserves are used as the 
pol icy-controlled parameters to test the neutrality of 
monetary pol icy in the long run. Within the 
target-instrument framework, a reaction function th~t 
relates Federal Reserve open marKet operations to pol icy 
goals is formed to explain both the endogenous and exogenous 
behavior of the monetary authority. Since the decision 
perio~ of the Federal Reserve is much shorter, quarterly 
observations are able to capture only the average Federal 
Reserve re~ponse. to economic events. Because of unceriainty 
about the detailed structure of the transmission mechanism 
and lags in the receipt of information about pol icy goal 
variables, intermediate targets are used by the monetary 
authority as an immediate operating guide in the money 
marKets. Therefore, an alternative reaction function that 
explains how the Federal Reserve responds to intermediate 
targets is also estimated. These reaction functions are 
estimated by the instrumental-variables estimation 
technique. A money supply function that has the stocK of 
money endogenously determined by the actions of the monetary 
authority, the banKing system, and the public is then 
estimated. The money supply function is estimated by the 
inst~umental-va~iables estimation technique, and the 
auto~eg~essive p~ocedu~e is used to co~~ect the p~oblem of 
se~ial co~~elation. A small dynamic mac~oeconomet~ic model 
that t~eats the stocK of money as endogenous and 
incorpo~ates ~ational expectations is developed, estimated, 
and simulated. The model is estimated by the th~ee-stage 
least-squa~es (3SLS) technique. 
4 
A survey of va~ious theo~etica1 studies is contained in 
chapte~ II. The p~ocess of monetary pol icy-maKing, the 
endogenous money supply, moneta~y institutions, and the 
effectiveness of moneta~y pol icy a~e discussed. The 
specification of ~eaction functions for the moneta~y 
autho~ity, the money supply function, and a small 
macroeconomet~ic model with rational expectations a~e 
p~esented in chapter III. The estimating techniques and 
data, the estimated models, and the econometric results a~e 
discussed in chapter IV. The equations and model are 
estimated using quarte~ly (seasonally adjusted) data fo~ the 
United States ove~ the 1953:1-1984:2 pe~iod. 
CHAPTER II 
THEORETICAL STUDIES 
The Process of Monetary Pol icy MaKing 
Targets, Instruments, and 
Indicators 
The strategy for pol icy control includes pol icy goals, 
intermediate pol icy targets, and pol icy instruments [8. M. 
Friedman, 1975; Saving, 1967]. Targets are measures used to 
guide the adjustment of pol icy variables. Full employment, 
economic growth, price stability, and equilibrium in the 
balance of payments are the commonly cited pol icy goals--the 
ultimate targets--of monetary pol icy. Intermediate targets 
are short-run operating guides. They are treated by the 
central bank as though they are the ultimate targets of 
pol icy, the view being that the intermediate targets are 
"closely" 1 inKed to the ultimate targets. Two reasons why 
the monetary authority adopts intermediate targets arez (1) 
some degree of uncertainty about the detailed structure of 
the transmission mechanism, and (2) the (recognition) lag in 
the receipt of information about the pol icy goal variables 
by the central banK. 
Monetary instruments are the tools of control directly 
5 
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manipulated by the monetary authority. The pol icy 
instruments of the Federal Reserve System include open 
market operations, the discount window, reserve 
requirements, Regulation Q, and moral suasion. The 
pr·incipal instrument of monetary management is open market 
operations. The Federal Open Market Committee <FOMC> of the 
Federal Reserve sets operating targets at each meeting and 
these decisions are intended to guide the open marKet 
trading desK at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York in 
planning security transactions. Adjustments in those 
instruments other than open marKet operations alter the 
relative rates of return either across banks or across 
different types of assets and 1 iabi1 ities [Kane, 1974]. 
Discount-rate pol icy can be viewed as a subsidy when 
the Federal Funds ra~e is above the discount rate. Changes 
in the difference between the Federal Funds rate and the 
discount rat~ are mainly influenced by the pol icy of the 
Federal Reserve.l That the Federal Funds rate is frequently 
above the discount rate since 1965 indicates nonprice 
rationing administered at the discount windov.J [Goodfriend, 
1983]. The Monetary Control Act of 1980 has made all 
depository institutions subject to the reserve requirements 
of the Federal Reserve since November-1980. 
Regulation Q tends to distort the significance of 
movements in the broader monetary aggregates since the loss 
of interest induces the publ_ic to economize on funds held in 
these assets and place them in competing market securities. 
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The Depository Institutions Deregulation Act of 1980 
required that Regulation Q be eliminated by April 1986. 
Without interest rate ceilings, more deposit 1 iabi1 ities pay 
explicit competitive rates of interest, and interest-bear·ing 
checkab) e deposits w i 11 be used for transactions purposes. 
Ther-efore, changes in interest rates can be expected to have 
a greater impact on consumption-saving decisions and a 
smaller effect on the growth of deposits as interest rate 
ceilings are. removed. 
Perr:lfman [1983] indicates that there are three 
conceptions of what a monetary indicator should be. First, 
a pol icy indicator should measure the thrust of monetary 
actions, permitting the classification of pol icy as "easy" 
or "tight". In this sense it is used directly by the 
central bank, or it is used to provide information to other-
sectors of the ecanomy to characterize the stance of current 
pol icy. Second, it is a monetary variable that should be 
closely correlated with economic activity, and beneficial to 
those participants in financial markets who desire a measure 
of the future path of economic activity. Third, th~ 
relevant measure should be independent of the business cycJe 
reflecting only the need for countercyclical pol icy actions. 
The Federal Reserve used changes in short-t~rm interest 
rate~ or free reserves as a monetary indicators in the 1950s 
2 
and 1960s. Since excessive monetary expansion raises 
interest rates through the price expectations effect, an 
increase in interest rates may either reflect a tight 
8 
monetary pol icy or result from an expansionary pol icy. 
Empirically, low interest rates are a sign of tight policy 
and high interest rates are a sign of easy one. From a 
Keynesian view, if the demand function for money were 
predictably stable, the money supply could be a better 
indicator than interest rate•, ana movements in th~ monetary 
aggregates would change forecasts of output and prices 
[Foot, 1981J. Dewald [1969, p. 3221 mentions. that, "if an 
appropriately chosen indicator were available without lag, 
then pol icy maKers could aim at a particular indicator value 
as a target of pol icy •••• It is indeed a variable or cla_ss 
of variables that could be considered as indicators as well 
as target~." For comparative statements about pol ic;::ies, an 
appropriate ordinal scal.e --an" index or indicator function 
of pol icy variables, should be constructed for ranKing 
policy actions meaningfully [Brunner and Meltzer, 19,69]. Af'! 
index function cannot be accurately computed because of. the 
lacK Df certainty and perfect Knowledge concerning the 
detail of economic structure; however, an optimal 
approximation could be determined-through appropri~te 
analysis. 
In summary, full employment, economic growth, price 
stability, and equilibrium in the balance of payments are 
the ultimate targets of monetary pol icy, Intermediate 
targets are adopted by the monetary authority as short-:-run 
operating guides. Monetary instruments are the tools.to 
achieve intermediate targets or pol icy goals. Open marKet 
operations are the principal instrument of monetary 
management. A monetary indicator is used to characterize 
the stance of current pol icy or to measure the future path 
of economy activity. 
The Operational Methods for Controlling 
the Target Variables 
General Comments 
The Target Variable. It is indicated that strong 
political forces maKe the Federal Reserve smooth out 
short-term interest rates because of the political 
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importance of the housing marKet and of the behavior of 
mortgage interest rates [Roos, 1981; Kane, 1980J. However, 
the monetary authority cannot peg the nominal rate for more 
than a very 1 imited period [Friedman, 1968]. Controlling 
the money supply by p~gging the Federal Funds rate is 
impossible because the Federal Reserve must maKe changes in 
the monetary base to maintain a given Federal Funds rate. A 
pegging of interest rates implies a loss of control over the 
money stocK. Poole [1970] has shown that, to stabilize 
nominal income, the monetary authority should target 
interest rates if money marKets were more subject to 
unanticipated shocKs than were goods marKets; while it 
should target on the money stocK if the reverse is true. 
Based on certain assumptions, B. M. Friedman [1975J 
indicates that the choice of intermediate targets depends 
upon the structural coefficients and upon the joint 
10 
distribution of the structural disturbance terms. 3 
Controllability is concerned with how the intermediate 
aggregate moves with the pol icy instruments. Predictability 
is concerned with how nomina 1 GNP moves with the 
intermediate aggregate. Both are important in the choice of 
a monetary aggregate [Corden, 1981]. A monetary aggregate 
must be chosen for which there is a stable demand function. 
The pred i c tab i 1 i ty (or stab i 1 i ty> of the mone:.v·-GNP 
relationship depends on the predictability Cor stability) of 
the growth rate of velocity.4 Brunner and Meltzer [1983] 
suggest that quarterly changes in velocity are a moving 
average of random shocks and there is no significant 
evidence of a change in the trend growth of velocity over 
the period 1951:2-1981:3. 5 The 1 inK between Ml growth and 
GNP growth is strong up to 1982:4; there is no evidence to 
support the view that the M2-GNP relationship was relatively 
stronger than the Ml-GNP relationship before 1982:4 [Batten, 
1983]. The Ml-GNP relationship became weaKer during 
1982-1983. Stabilizing the money supply would not perfectly 
stab i 1 i ze nomina 1 income if the rea 1 side, such as changes 
in saving propensities or the desire to invest~ or external 
demand factors, were unstable [Corden, 1981]. It is argued 
by Rasche that focusing on one aggregate would not 
necessarily cause major problems because the actual behavior 
of a 11 the aggregates tends to be simi 1 ar in the 1 ong run 
[Meltzer, Rasche, Stern1 ight, and Axilrod, 1982]. 
The Speed of Return to Target. The greater short-term 
1 1 
interest rate volatility and marKet uncertainty, the greater 
the costs of getting better long-run monetary control. The 
aggressiveness of monetary control actions depends on (1) 
the size of the response in short-term interest rates; (2) 
the relative benefits provided to the economy by more stable 
short-term interest rates versus better monetary control; 
and (3) the nature of deviations of M1 from target [Judd, 
19823. Federal Reserve research suggests that temporary 
aberrations in money growth rates create few difficulties 
for the economy so long as the desired growth rates are 
effectively attained within two to four quarters [Wall ich, 
19783. 
Monetary Institution. It is difficult for any 
government to pursue a purely discretionary monetary pol icy 
which is independent of either fixed ~xchange rates or 
monetary rules [Griffiths and Wood, 19813. Under the gold 
exchange standard (up to 1914), the gold bull ion standard 
<1925-1931), and the go1d-do11ar-ster1 ing exchange standard 
(1946-1971), some degree of stability in domestic prices was 
assured by the resulting fixed exchange rates. Since 1971, 
the adoption of exchange rate flexibility replaced a balance 
of payments problem with a domestic inflation problem as an 
expansionary monetary pol icy was followed. Barro and Gordon 
[1983] assert that the presence or absence of precommitment 
is the most important distinction between rules and 
discretion. A simple rule can internalize the connection 
between monetary actions and inflationary expectations, but 
12 
it ignores uncertainty about variables or about model 
structure. Discretion permits what may be regarded as some 
desirable flexibility of monetary growth, but the monetary 
authority cannot predict the actual course of monetary 
growth and inflation. Within a discretionary regime, 
inflationary expectations are treated as givens, the 
monetary growth rate is chosen to equate the marginal cost 
of actual inflation to the marginal benefit from additional 
revenue [Barro, 19831.6 The trade-off between unemployment 
and inflation is central to the pol icymaKer~s decision. The 
optimal solution--a natural unemployment rate and zero 
inflation rate occurs only if the pol icymaKer can predict 
future actions [Barro and Gordon, 1983]. 
Monetary rules for the growth of the monetary 
aggregates are proposed because of procycl ical monetary 
growth. In principle, a flexible pol icy based on some form 
of optimal control is better than a rigid rule [Sargent and 
Wa 11 ace, 1976]. Persistent changes in the grot.<Jth of 
productivity may change the growth of output and the rate of 
money growth consistent with a fixed inflation rate. Based 
on the evidence from Switzer 1 and and Canada, i t may be 
better to operate monetary targets with some degree of 
discretion rather than with rigid rules. However, due to 
the changing structure of the economy and a long (and 
variable) time lag in the dynamics of monetary processes, 
monetarists insist that monetary pol icy cannot be used to 
fine tune the economy. To monetarists, changes in the 
13 
growth rate of the money stock are the dominant cause of 
fluctuations in money income [Andersen and Carlson, 19701. 
Monetary pol icy should prevent money itself from being a 
major source of economic disturbance. If the rules of 
monetary pol icy change frequently, the forecast of the 
weekly money supply made by market participants may .be 
biased and inefficient because of an imperfect knowledge of 
the structure of the economy. Any attempt to use activist 
stabilization pol icy is 1 iable to make the economy less 
rather than more stable. It has been shown that a 
systematic activist pol icy has no ability to stabilize the 
economy within some models [Brunner and Meltzer, 1983; 
Kmenta and Smith, 1973; Sargent and Wallace, 19761. The key 
argument of monetarists is to 1 imit the scope of 
governmental influence over economic activity. A more 
predictable control procedure would result in a more stable 
financial market. 
In summary, the choice of intermediate targets depends 
upon the structure of the economy. Controllability and 
predictability are important in the choice of a monetary 
aggregate. A pegging of nominal rates implies a loss of 
control over the money stock. However, greater short-term 
interest rate volatility and market uncertainty were to be 
the costs of better long-run monetary control. A monetary 
rule with some degree of discretion is desirable. To 
monetarists, monetary pol icy cannot be used to fine tune the 
economy and should prevent money itself from being a major 
source of economic disturbance. 
A Short History of Post-War 
Federal Reserve Open 
Market Operations 
14 
A 1952 study of the U. S. government securities marKet 
concluded that the Federal Reserve's open market 
transactions had to represent only a relatively small share 
of total dealer transactions to be effective for defensive 
type operations [Wall ich and Keir, 1978]. In early 1953, 
the Federal Reserve decided to focus its open marKet 
operations on short-term interest rates and the free 
reserves of member banks. The Federal Reserve influences 
the Federal Funds rate and other short-term interest rates 
via direct control over nonborrowed reserves. Free reserves 
respond to changes in short-term interest rates and the 
discount rate. Federal Reserve pol icy was associated with 
the business cycle and disregarded money supply behavior. 
During the 1960-61 recession, an easy monetary pol icy pushed 
down short-term interest rates encouraging capital outflows 
and resulting in increased balance-of payments deficits. 
The FOMC has gradually shifted from contro11 ing money 
market conditions to monetary aggregate targets since the 
early 1960s. Around the mid-1960s, the FOMC began to focus 
more than it had earlier on the 1 inKages of the monetary 
process to pol icy goals. The FOMC started using banK credit 
as an intermediate target in the spring of 1966. 7 However, 
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"money mar-l<et conditions" continued to be the dominant 
oper-ating tar-get for- open mar-l<et oper-ations dur-ing those 
year-s. In 1970, the shor-t-r-un conduct of open mar-l<et 
oper-ations increased the emphasis on the monetar-y aggr-egates 
with about equal weight on bani< cr-edit and the money stock. 
Bani< cr-edit and the money stocK wer-e emphasized as pr-imary 
tar-gets and their- aver-age gr-owth r-anges wer-e specified. 
Open mar-l<et oper-ations wer-e dir-ected at maintaining 
money-mar-ket conditions consistent with a modest gr-owth in 
the monetar-y aggr-egates. The Feder-al Funds rate range was 
to be adjusted when the gr-owth of monetary aggregates r-anged 
outside the tar-get r-anges or- when the monetary aggr-egates 
tar-gets wer-e changed. Since the infor-mation on the monetar-y 
aggr-egates gr-owth was available only weekly, the FOMC set a 
r-eser-ve target in ter-ms of r-eser-ves available to suppor-t 
pr-ivate deposits <RPD> as an effective day-to-day oper-ating 
guide in Febr-uar-y 1972. 8 However-, the RPD gr-owth could not 
be contr-olled tightly in the shor-t r-un because of lagged 
r-eser-ve accounting. The FOMC continued using "money mar-l<et 
conditions" as its immediate oper-ating tar-get. There was 
still pr-essur-e on the Federal Reser-ve to soften the impact 
of chronic government deficits on inter-est rates in early 
1970s. 
In the 1970s, inflation became a dominant economic 
problem. Pr-ocycl ical monetar-y gr-owth acceler-ated inflation 
dur-ing expansion and incr-eased unemployment dur-ing 
I 
r-ecession. The FOMC began to r-epor-t publ icly,the shor-t-r-un 
16 
target ranges for the Federal Funds rate, Ml, and M2 in 
January 1974.9 Short-run flexibility in the money stocK was 
thought to be needed to offset the impact of transitory 
shocKs on the money marKet and the foreign exchange marKet. 
Trying to control inflation and to achieve greater stability 
in output growth, annual growth rates for the monetary 
aggregates <M1, M2, and M3) and one measure of banK credit 
began being announced quarterly in and since March 1975. 10 
These long-run growth ranges, normally constructed from the 
general economic goals, are set within 2 to 3 percent annual 
rate range to give the central banK some degree of 
f 1 ex i b i 1 i ty. Short-run growth ranges cor1s i sten t with annua 1 
growth ranges were the primary focus of open market 
operations. 
In October 1979, the Federal Reserve adopted a reserve-
aggregates approach to monetary control. Open market 
operations were to be conducted to control nonborrowed 
reserves directly rather than to control the Federal Funds 
rate. The main reason for a nonborrowed reserve operating 
target, rather than a total reserves or total base target, 
is that it provides more time to permit fluctuations in the 
money supply to average itself out [Axilrod, 1983J. The 
Federal Reserve establishes a total reserves path, obtained 
by required reserves consistent with the short-run money 
growth ta.rge ts and ar• est i rna te of excess reserves, as a 
general guide. 11 Nonborrowed reserves are calculated on the 
basis of forecasts of banK borrowings from the Federal 
17 
Rese~ve. The p~actical ope~ative ta~get is a weekly ave~age 
of nonbo~~owed ~ese~ves ove~ a th~ee- to five-week inte~val. 
The t~anslation f~om money supply targets to the desi~ed 
rese~ve is ~eviewed each week and is adjusted if the assumed 
money multipl ie~ we~e changed. In the sho~t ~un, the banks~ 
bo~~owing can be va~ied to offset the undesi~ed effect on 
money f~om changes in the deposit to ~ese~ve multipl ie~ 
[Meltzer et al., 1982J.12 The FOMC still indicates a r·ange 
fo~ the Fede~al Funds ~ate--4 to 7 percent--as a potential 
sou~ce of information on the availability of rese~ves. If 
the lagged ~ese~ve ~equi~ement rule is eliminated and the 
Fede~al Reserve discount ~ates are more flexible, the 
Fede~al Reserve could improve its cont~ol ove~ the money 
supply by ta~geting the total ~ese~ves because the ~isK of 
e~~o~ through unexpected mu1tip1 ie~ variations would be 
~educed [Meltzer et al ., 1982]. 
Financial innovation and deregulation in the ear-ly 
1980s a~e alleged to have inc~eased the substitutability 
between Ml and othe~ financial assets. These financial 
innovations include the money ma~Ket mutual funds, the 
nationwide NOW accounts (Janua~y 1, 1981), the tax-exempt 
all-savers certificates (Octobe~ 1, 1981), the Garn-St 
I 
Ge~main money ma~ket deposit accounts <Decembe~ 14, 1982), 
and the super-NOW accounts (Janua~y 5, 1983). 
Interest-bea~ing NOW accounts pe~mit holde~s to use 
negotiable o~ders of withd~awa1 ve~y much as they would use 
checKs. The absence of ~ese~ve ~equi~ements on moneY ma~Ket 
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deposit accounts enables deposito~y institutions to pay 
inte~est ~ates above those on ~eservable checKing deposits. 
The supe~-NOW accounts a~e f~ee of inte~est ~ate ceilings 
but a~e still subject to rese~ve ~equi~ements. With the 
difficulty of inte~p~eting the movements in Ml, the FOMC 
~educe~ its emphasis on Ml, inc~eased the weight given M2, 
and set the short-~un target on M3 during the fourth qua~te~ 
of 1982. The Fede~al Reserve has adopted a p~ocedu~e for 
ta~geting open market operations on ave~age levels of 
~ese~ves borrowed from Federal Rese~ve BanKs since October 
1982 [Gilbert, 1985]. The ~eason is that a la~ge p~oportion 
of ~equi~ed rese~ves a~e against the deposit 1 iabil ities in 
Ml unde~ the previous p~ocedu~e of ta~geting nonbo~~owed 
reserves. At each meeting, the FOMC specifies a desired 
level of bo~~owed ~ese~ves ove~ the inte~meeting period. If 
the FOMC d i ~ec t i ve ca 11 s for an i nc~ease in r·ese~ve 
~estraint, the Open Ma~ket DesK would increase its ta~get 
for borrowed ~eserves as an inc~ease in the estimate of 
total reserves. A change to contempo~aneous rese~ve 
requirements <CRR) with a two-day lag, designed to 
st~engthen the relationship between t~ansaction deposit 
balances and the total ~eserves of depository institutions, 
was adopted in February, 1984 [Gilbe~t and Trebing, 1982J. 13 
Under CRR, requi~ed reserves are based on the average 
transaction deposit 1 iabil ities over 14 days ending two days 
before the end of the cur~ent ~eserve maintenance period 
(two weeKs ending Wednesday) plus the average 1 iabil ities 
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other than transaction deposits over 14 days ending 30 days 
before the current reserve maintenance period. This system 
is not exactly contemporaneous because the periods over 
which reserves are counted still lag. 
In summary, short-term interest rates and free reserves 
were alternative operating guides used by the Federal 
Reserve in the 1950s and 1960s. The short-run conduct of 
open market operations increased the emphasis on the 
monetary aggregates in the 1970s. The FOMC began to 
announce the short-run and long-run target ranges for the 
monetary aggregates in 1974 and 1975, respectively. In 
October 1979, the Federal Reserve adopted a reserve-
aggregates approach to monetary control. Nonborrowed 
reserves are the practical operative target. Financial 
innovation and deregulation in the early 1980s increase the 
substitutability between M1 and other financial assets. 
With the difficulty of interpreting the movements in Ml, the 
FOMC increased its emphasis on M2 and M3 in 1982:4. Also, 
the Federal Reserve has adopted a procedure for targeting on 
borrowed reserves since October 1982. 
International Experience 
Evidence indicates that the central banks of 
Switzerland and Canada have had the ability to control a 
chosen monetary aggregate for several years [Freeman, 1981; 
Schiltknecht, 1981]. From 1975 to 1978, the Swiss National 
Bank chose the adjusted monetary base as an operating 
20 
variable for achieving a money stock target. A band of 3 to 
7 percent for the annual growth in the money stock was 
suggested for a stable growth economy at a zero inflation 
rate. Based on a money mu1tip1 ier model, it was assumed 
that the money stock would only be adjusted to a 
deterministic change in the monetary base. Unless the 
multiplier were extraordinarily variable, maintaining the 
monetary base along the desired growth path would not lead 
to large swings in money growth. This pol icy practically 
achieved stable prices. The evidence from Canada indicates 
that a monetary growth target through the process of bank 
credit expansion has helped in contro11 ing inflation. The 
authority chose Ml as the target and ~ffected the publ ic~s · 
demand for money via greater variation in interest rates. 14 
The target ranges are defined as a band of uniform width 
with 1 imits 2 percent above and 2 percent below the 
midpoints of the ranges. 
The role of exchange fluctuations can be important for 
any open economy [Schiltknecht, 19811. In 1979, the Swiss 
National Bank chose an exchange rate target to prevent a 
further rapid appreciation of the Swiss franc, pegging the 
exchange rate and temporarily allowing the money stock to 
rise. The money stock was expanded along a medium-term path 
designed to keep prices stable. It implies that a monetary 
pol icy aimed at price stability should take into account the 
monetary developments in other countries. 
The Federal Reserve~s Reaction 
Function 
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Wood [1967] was the first to develop and test a Federal 
Reserve reaction function, a behavioral equation measuring 
the response of pol icy instruments to movements in targets 
and exogenous forces. Government pol icy instruments, thus, 
are treated as endogenous. It is presumed that the Federal 
Reserve conducts open market operations to maximize an 
assumed utility function of the public subject to a given 
structure of the economy. 
If society~s desires are insatiable, a utility function 
relating the Federal Reserve~s view of the publ ic~s welfare 
to pol icy goal variables can be written as 
where U =utility 
y = real income 
UN= unemployment 
P = prices 
BP = the balance of payments. 
( 2. 1) 
Current rea 1 income and emp 1 oymen t are direct 1 y re 1 a ted to 
the utilities of the public during that same period. Since 
current price levels and the balance of payments affect real 
income and employment in future periods, they are included 
i n the u t i 1 i t y fun c t i on • 
Maximizing equation (2.1) subject to the Federal 
Reserve~s view of the structure of the economy, a reaction 
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function for the monetary authority may be written as 
I 
(2.2) 
where GS =Federal Reserve's holdings of securities 
X= other exogenous variables influencing those 
targets 
e2,t = disturbance in period t which is assumed 
independently normally distributed with zero mean 
and finite variance. 
The coefficients of the reaction function represent the 
combinations of structural and utility parameters. It is 
immaterial whether or not the Federal Reserve responds to 
the ultimate or intermediate targets because of the 
assumption that the monetary authority has full Knowledge of 
the structure of the economic system. Empirical results of 
Wood [1967l, Teigen [1969l, HavrilesKy, Sapp, and Schweitzer 
[1975] suggest strongly that the Federal Reserve responded 
systematically to variations in targets and predetermined 
variables during periods 1952-1963, 1953-1964, and 
1964-1974, respectively. 
The Endogenous Money Supply 
The contemporary money-supply paradigm [Steindl, 1982l, 
of which the Friedman-eagan money supply model, the 
Brunner-Meltzer-St.Louis Federal Reserve Bank money supply 
model, and the Branson money supply model are variants, all 
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show that the money supp 1 >' is affected by interactions among 
the monetary authority, the banking system, and the public. 
These models are summarized as follows: 
(1) The Friedman-eagan Money Supply Model 
1 
t-1 = . H (2.3) 
C/M + R/D - C/M • R/D 
•J.Jher·e ~1 = the money stock, M2 
c = the currency component of M 
R = required reser-ves against deposits 
D = deposits at commercial banks. 
H = high-powered money. 
0 M/oH>O, oM/cHC/M)<O, and aM/cHR/0)(0. Equation (2.3) can 
be derived from the definition of M and from the uses of 
high-powered money [Cagan, 1965; Friedman and Schwar· tz, 
1963b]. 
(2) The Brunner-Meltzer-St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank 
Money Supply Model 
1 + K 
M1 = ·H (2.4) 
r < 1 +d+ t) +k 
where M1 = the narrow money stock 
k = the ratio of currency held by the public to the 
demand deposits of the public, Dp 
r = reserve requirement 
d =the ratio of the demand deposits of U. S. 
Tre.a.sury to Dp 
t =the ratio of time deposits to Dp 
H = high-powered money. 
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aM1/~H>O, aM1/ak<O, aM1/ar<o, aM1/ad<O, and aM1/at<o. 
Equation (2.4) can be derived from the definition of M1 and 
from the uses of high-powered money [Brunner and Meltzer, 
1968; Burger and Rasche, 1977]. 
(3) The Branson Money Supply Model 
NB - FR 
M = (2.5) 
h + z(l -h) 
where M = the narrow money stock 
NB = the nonborrowed base provided by the Federal 
Reserve mainly through open market operationsl5 
FR = free reserves 
h = the ratio of currency held by the public to the 
money stock 
z =the reserve requirement of demand deposits. 
aM/oNB>O, aM/aFR<O, aM/ah<O, and aM/az<O. Equation <2.5> 
can be derived from the sources and uses of high-powered 
money [Branson, 19791. FR is a function of market interest 
rate i and the discount rate id, FR = f(i - id) where 
oFR/oi<O, oFR/oid>O, and dFR/d(i - id><O. 
The main impact of the Federal Reserve System is 
through changes in high-powered money. Federal Reserve 
credit outstanding (i.e., its monetary 1 iabilities) accounts 
for the major changes in high-powered money. The effect on 
the money stock of high-powered mone>' may be weak in 
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short-run movements because of lags, but the effect has an 
important role in secular movements [Cagan, 19651. The 
banKing system responds to changes in marKet interest rates 
and the discount rate. BanKs expand loans and deposits by 
reducing excess reserves and by borrowing additional 
reserves at the discount window during expansions, and vice 
versa during contractions [Branson, 1979; Rea, 1976]. The 
demand for currency in circulation depends not only on 
transactions but also on wealth holdings. The 
currency-money ratio represents the publ ic~s preference for 
currency, which depends on how the relevant demand factors 
affect currency and commercial banK deposits differently 
[Cagan, 19651. Empirical test results have shown that the 
supply of money should be treated endogenously [Brunner and 
Meltzer, 1968; Gibson, 1972; Teigen, 1964 and 19761. Teigen 
indicates that short-term interest rates 1 inK the supply 
function of money to the rest of the economy. 
Rational Expectations and Pol icy 
Ineffectiveness 
Theoretical Framework 
Expectations play an important role in influencing 
agents' decisions. The strong ratio~al expectations 
hypothesis implies that agents are assumed to have full 
information concerning all lagged variables in the model. 
The information set is It· Changes in a pol icy rule result 
in changes in the parameters of the model as the public 
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taKes actions to respond to the altered rule [Griffiths and 
Wood, 1981; Hafer, 1983; Lucas, 1975; McCallum, 1980J. 
Under rat i on al expect at i on s, i n d i v i dual s try to use a 1 1 
available information to anticipate the consequences of all 
events. However, information is both costly and imperfect; 
the future is unKnown and no agent is perfectly informed as 
to the current state of the economy [Lucas, 1975J. The 
current shocKs are not observable by either the monetary 
authority or individuals. It is customary to taKe the 
rational expectation of a variable as its conditional 
mathematical expectation. 
Fr·iedman~s ideas have shaped a generation of 
monetarists. He asserts that changes in the money stocK 
resu 1 t in shor-t-run changes in both nomina 1 and rea 1 income; 
i.e., ther-e exists a short-run Phi11 ips relation [Friedman 
et al ., 1974]. A monetary expansion lowers the nominal 
interest rate initially; prices then are raised through an 
income effect and price expectations are adjusted with a 
lag. Eventually, nominal interest rates rise above their 
initial level because of the Fisher effect. The 
transmission mechanism, connecting a change in the quantity 
of money with a change in total nominal income, operates 
through the changes in interest rates and the relative 
prices. Inter-est rates on financial assets not only affect 
the marginal cost of 1 iabil ity extension, but also influence 
the substitution between financial and real assets. This 
substitution changes the prices of real assets relative to 
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their supply prices. The change in relative prices is a Key 
element in the adjustment of economic activity. The price 
level is flexible, though not necessarily perfectly so, and 
is a joint outcome of the monetary forces and the real 
forces. The temporary trade-off between inflation and 
unemployment comes from the unanticipated inflation. An 
aggregate supply function rationalized by Lucas [Lucas, 
1973; McCallum, 1980] can be written as 
ln Yt = ql + q 2 [ln Pt- ECln Pt:It)] + q 3 ln Yt-l 
+ e6,t <2.6) 
where y = real output 
P = general price level 
E<ln Pt:It> =the rational expectation of ln Pt16 
e 6 ,t = disturbance in period t which is assumed to be 
independently normally distributed with zero 
mean and finite variance. 
Agents~ inflationary expectations are based on 
available information <It> and Knowledge of the model~s 
structure. They form inflationa~y expectations by 
forecasting the pol icymaKer's best action. No systematic 
inflation surprises exist; however, surprises do occur 
because of the stochastic terms in the model. The 
unanticipated inflation rate equation can be derived from a 
specified model with a competitive equilibrium system, 
imperfect information, and rational expectations as [Sarro, 
1981a; Lucas, 1975; McCallum, 1980J 
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ln Pt- E<ln Ptllt> = n1 [ln Mt- E(ln Mtllt>l + e7,t 
(2.7) 
whe~e M = nominal money stocK 
e 7 ,t = distu~bance in pe~iod t which is assumed 
independently no~mally dist~ibuted with ze~o mean 
and finite va~iance. 
F~om equations (2.6) and (2.7), the output equation can be 
w~itten as 
ln yt = q1 + n1q 2 [1n Mt- E(ln Mtllt)J + q3 ln Yt-l 
(2.8) 
whe~e e 8 ,t = e 6 ,t + q2 e 7 ,t , distu~bance in pe~iod t which 
is assumed independently no~ma11y dist~ibuted 
with ze~o mean and finite va~iance. 
Only unanticipated money movements can have nonneut~al 
effects on ~eal va~iables because people do not possess 
pe~fect info~mation [Ba~~o, 1981a ; Lucas, 1975]. Any 
~andom movements in the money supply cannot be immediately 
distinguished f~om random movements in relative demand. An 
unanticipated increase in the money supply may confuse 
individual suppliers into believing that there has been an 
increase in relative demand for their firm's output and a 
random rise in its relative price; therefore, more output is 
supplied. The larger the variation in unanticipated money 
growth, the smaller the impact of unanticipated money growth 
on output since the less 1 ikely individual suppliers believe 
• 
that it is their particular market that had a favorable 
relative demand shift [Attfield and DucK, 1983; Sarro, 
1981a; Lucas, 1973J. Unanticipated money movements may 
affect output with a lag because firms may respond 
immediately to the unanticipated movements in demand by 
adjusting inventories and later increase production to 
restore the desired inventories. 
29 
Rational expectations combined with a natural-rate-type 
view of the world means that a monetary fluctuation affects 
only the general level of prices in the long run, but has no 
e f f e c t on rea 1 ou t p u t , i • e • , - there ex i s t s a v e r t i c a 1 
long-run Phi11 ips relation [Andersen and Carlson, 1970; 
Barr· o, 1 981 a; Fr i e dman e t a 1 • , 1 974; Gr i f f i t h s and f.....lood, 
1981]. The reduced form of output can be written as 
ln Yt = ql + q3 ln Yt-1 + e9,t ( 2. 9) 
where e 9 ,t = e 6 ,t + q2 e7,t + n1q2 e~ , disturbance in 
period t which is assumed independently 
normally distributed with zero mean and finite 
variance. 
Activist stabilization pol icy is ineffective because the 
private sector discovers its systematic effect on output and 
employment and adapts to it. Rules with feedback can be 
worse than rules without if they increase the uncertainty of 
agents~ information set. 
In summary, under the rational expectations hypothesis, 
only the unanticipated money movements have nonneutral 
effects on real variables because random movements in the 
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money supply cannot be immediately distinguished f~om ~andom 
movements in ~elative demand. The tempora~y t~ade-off 
between inflation and unemployment comes f~om the 
unanticipated inflation. Systematic pol icy is ineffective 
in the short ~un and long ~un. 
Empi~ical Results 
The ~esults of Vande~Hoff [1983] conclude that the 
~ational expectations model best fits the U. S. quarterly 
data for the pe~iod 1951:4 to 1980:2. The models of 
Ande~sen and Carlson [1970J, Beenstock and DicKs [1983] 
indicate that changes in the money stock can have an 
influence on real magnitudes in the sho~t ~un, while 
influencing only nominal magnitudes in the long run. Fair 
[1976] also indicates that monetary pol icy is effective in 
the short run, if monetary pol icy is defined as a change in 
the value of government securities outstanding with other 
things being equal. The empirical tests of Attfield and 
DucK [1983J and Sarro [1981b and 1981cl support the 
proposition that only unanticipated monetary growth affects 
real economic variables. The results of Attfield and DucK 
[1983] and Lucas [1973] indicate that the impact on output 
of unanticipated monetary growth declines the more 
unpredictable monetary growth becomes. The higher the 
variance in average prices, the less 1 iKely the individual 
supplier is to be confused into believing that his marKet 
has a relative increase in demand. 
Endnotes 
1The Federal Funds rate is the market interest rate on 
one-day loans of member-bank reserve balances on deposit at 
Federal Banks. 
2Free reserves are defined as excess reserves minus 
borrowed/reserves from the System. 
3Th(is argument is based on the following assumptions 
! 
[8. M. F~iedman, 1975]. First, the coefficients of 
! 
structu~a1 equations are nonrandom and Known with certainty. 
Second, this is a one-period model which does not analyze 
dynamic results. Third, the pol icy authorities may have 
some preferences about the intermediate target vaiues per 
se, wholly appart from the impact of these variables on the 
ultimate target variables. 
4Since MV = Y, GM + Gv = Gy where G represents the 
annual growth rate. 
5Gould and Nelson [1974] use an ARIMA technique. They 
also conclude that velocity is a random walK, i.e., changes 
in velocity are serially uncorrelated. 
6-rhe co:.t of inflation depends on the values for the 
•Jnemp 1 oymen t rate and i nf 1 at ion. The benefits to positive 
inflation surprises include an unanticipated capital levy on 
holdings of the government,..s nominal 1 iabil ities (i.e., the 
revenue from money creation) and a lower real value of 
publ i c debt. 
7The FOMC uses daily-average statistics on total member 
bank deposits as a "banK credit proxy" because they are 
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compiled on a daily basis with a very short lag and the 
average deposit figures for a month are much less subject to 
the influence of single-date fluctuations than are the 
available month-end (the last Wednesday) data on total banK 
credit. 
8RPD is defined as total member banK reserves minus 
reserves required on government and interbanK deposits. 
9oata on the broader M~s and banK credit are available 
only after significantly longer time lags. 
10BanK credit includes total banK loans and investments 
(measured on a monthly average basis) less interbanK loans. 
The differences in the behavior of various M~s are due to 
the regulatory constraints or the ability of the innovation 
in the financial system. 
11Tota1 reserves control is not a practical objective in 
the short run because it may lead to large fluctuations in 
financial markets. 
12 Borrowed reserves are provided when the Federal 
Reserve lends reserves to banks through its discount 
mechanism. Borrowed reserves rise only if the Federal Funds 
rate increases sufficiently above the discount rate to 
overcome banks~ reluctance to borrow. 
13Lagged reserve requirements (LRR> were changed from a 
one-day lag to a two-weeK lag in September 1968; the 
required reserves for a given weeK ending Wednesday are 
based on the average daily deposit 1 iabil ities in the 1-week 
computation period two weeKs earlier. It is believed that 
LRR are welcomed by small banKs and may help to stop their 
departure from the Federal Reserve System. 
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14 It is d iff i cu 1 t to control the short-run groJA•th rate 
of a broad aggregate through changes in short-term interest 
rates because those items included are close substitutes. 
15The dominant sources of the nonborrowed base are the 
Federal Reserve~s portfolio of government securities, gold 
certificates and foreign exchange held by the Federal 
Reserve. 
16 [ln Pt- E<ln Ptllt)] fs the unanticipated inflation 





The Reaction Function Rel•ting 
Federal Reserve Open Market 
Operations to Pol icy Goals 
Under the assumption that the monetary authority sets 
pol icy to achieve pol icy goals, a reaction function of 
Federal Reserve open market operations can be specified as 
ln URt = a 1 + a 2 (UNt- UNt_1> + a3 (ln Yt - ln Yt_1 > 
- a 4 <ln Pt- ln Pt_1 > - a 5 BPt + a 6 ln URt-1 
+ e1,t (3.1> 
where UR = nonborrowed reserves 
UN= unemployment rate 
J y = real GNP 
P = GNP price deflator 
BP =real balance on current account 
e 1 ,t =disturbance in period t which is assumed 
independently normally distributed with zero mean 
and finite variance. 
The level of nonborrowed reserves is used to represent 
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Federal Reserve open marKet operations. The change in the 
unemp 1 oymen t rate, the growth rate of rea 1 income, the rate 
of inflation, and the real balance on current account are 
used as the variables relevant, respectively, to the 
ultimate targets of full employment, economic growth, price 
stabfl ity, and equilibrium in the balance of payments. For 
countercyclical purposes, the sign of the change in 
unemployment rate is expected to be positive, and those of 
the inflation rate and the real balance on current account 
are expected to be negative. A positive sign of the growth 
rate of real i r.come exp1 ai ns that the Federal Reserve must 
pr·ov ide reserves to accommodate short-term rea 1 income 
changes. The sign of the lagged dependent variable is 
.expected to be positive reflecting the response of monetary 
pol icy to changes in the performance of the economy subject 
to a distributed lag. Federal Reserve behavior is 
endogenously determined by pol icy goals, it is also 
exogenously explained by the parameters of the constant term 
and lagged dependent variable. The coefficients: a 1 and a 6 
are policy-controlled parame ter··s. 
The Reaction Function Relating 
Federal Reserve Open MarKet 
Operations to Intermediate 
Tar·ge ts 
An alternative reaction function that relates Federal 
Reserve open marKet operations to intermediate target 
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variables can be specified as 
(3.2) 
where =short-term nominal interest r-ate 
Dl = dummy variable, taKes the value of 1 after 1969:4 
and zero otherwise 
M = the nominal money stocK <Ml)l 
02 =dummy variable, taKes the value of 1 after 1979:3 
and zero otherwise 
= random disturbance term which is assumed 
independently normally distributed with zero mean 
and finite variance. 
Due to the uncertainties, money marKet conditions are 
traditionally chosen by the Federal Reserve as a short-run 
objective because information on these variables is 
available frequently and the marKet can respond quicKly to 
pol icy operations. 2 Short-term interest rates and free 
reserves were alternative operating guides specified by the 
FOMC for the account management in the 1950s and 1960s; free 
I 
reserves were changed to obtain the desired level of 
short-term interest rates. In the early 1970s, money market 
conditions were still used by the FOMC as its immediate 
operating target. The change in the short-term interest 
rate is used as a proxy variable measuring money market 
conditions. The sign of the change in the short-term 
interest rate is expected to be negative, which reflects 
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defensive open market operations intended to protect the 
money market from disturbances.3 The dummy variable, 01, is 
used to taKe into account the growing emphasis on the 
monetary aggregates in the 1970s. The short-run and 
long-run target ranges for the monetary aggregates have been 
announced since 1974 and 1975, respectively. The sign of 
the growth rate of the money stocK is expected to be 
negative for countercyclical purpose. The dummy variable, 
02, is used to take into account a reserve-aggregates 
approach to monetary control in October 1979. The sign of 
02 is expected to be negative for a better monetary control. 
The coefficients: b 1 , b 4 , and b 5 are pol icy-controlled 
parameters. 
The Money Supply Function 
The money supply function can be specified as 
1 n M t = c 1 + c 2 1 n URt + c 3 i t - c 4 i ~ - c 5 Z t 
- c6 <Ht- Ht-1) + c7 03 + e3,t (3.3) 
where id = the discount rate of the Federal Reserve BanK 
Z =the reserve requirement for demand deposits 
H = the ratio of currency held by the public to the 
money stocK 
03 = dummy variable, taKes the value of 1 after 1982:2 
and zero otherwise 
= random disturbance term vJh i ch is assumed 
independently normally distributed with zero mean 
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and finite variance. 
It accounts both for the Federal Reserve pol icy influences 
and the marKet~s responses in determining the stocK of 
money. Nonborrowed reserves, the discount rate, and reserve 
requirements are controlled directly by the Federal Reserve. 
An increase in nonborrowed reserves, or a decrease in the 
discount rate, or reserve requirements increases banKs' 
excess reserves, and then expands the money supply. The 
banKing system responds to market interest rates and the 
discount rate. BanKs expand loans and deposits as marKet 
interest rates increase. The currency-Ml ratio represents 
the publ ic~s preference for currency. When the publ ic~s 
money holdings increase, the stocK of money is expected to 
be decreased. The dummy variable, 03, is used to taKe into 
account financial innovation and deregulation in the earlY 
1980s. The sign of 03 is expected to be positive because 
travelers checKs of nonbanK issuers~ interest-bearing NOW 
accounts, automatic transfer service accounts, and credit 
union share draft accounts are contained in Ml. 
A Small Macroeconometric Model With 
Rational Expectations 
The structural equations are expressed in the IS-LM 
format using an aggregate supply function rationalized by 
Lucas. The aggregate price and quantity are determined by 
the intersection point of an aggregate demand curve and an 
aggregate supply curve. The money stocK is treated as 
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endogenous. A discretionary pol icy rule is included; it is 
assumed that the public understands the nature of the 
pol icymaker~s optimization problem in each period. The 
exogenous determinants of nonborrowed reserves are used as 
pol icy-controlled parameters to test the pol icy 
ineffectiveness propositi on. The mode 1 consists of , the 
following set of equations: 
** ** ' = d1 - d2 rt - d3 rt_1 + d4 <ln Mt - ln Pt> 
+ d 5 ln Gt- d 6 ln TAXt_1 + d 7 t + d8 ln Yt-1 
+ e4,t (3.4) 
( 3. 5) 
1 n Mt = g1 + g2 1 n URt + i - g4 
.d 




r ** t 
UR = t 
Yt = 
= k1 
- g6 <Ht - Ht-1> + 97 03 + e3,t 
h 1 + h2 <UNt - UNt-1) + h3 <ln yt 
- h4 ( 1 n 
+ e 1 
,t 
Pt - 1 n Pt-1> - hs BPt + 
j1 + j2 [ 1 n p -t E<ln Ptllt)l + j3 
+ e 6 ,t 
+ k2 it + K3 ( i - i t-1) + k4 ·** t 1 t-1 
= i ** -t [E<1n p t 1 It> - 1 n pt-1] 
(3.3) 
- 1 n yt-1) 
h6 1 n URt-1 
( 3 .1) 
1 n Yt-1 
( 3. 6) 
+ e7,t 
(3.7) 
( 3. 8) 
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UNt = s 1 - s 2 < 1 n yt - 1 n Yt_1 ) - s 3 < 1 n Yt_1 - 1 n Yt-i 
- s4 <ln Mt-1- ln pt-1) + s5 t + s6 U~-1 + e9,t 
(3.9) 
where r** = long-term real interest rate 
G = real government purchases of goods and services 
TAX= real net receipts of government 
t = the time trend 
E<ln Ptllt) =the expectation held in period t for 
ln Pt 
i ** = 1 ong-term nominal interest rate 
e 4 , t' e 5 , t' e 3 , t' e 1 , t' e 6 , t' e 7 , t' and e 9 , t 
= disturbances in period t which are assumed 
independently normally distributed with zero 
mean and finite variance. 
y, r**, M, P, i, UR, i**, and UN are endogenous variables, 
and all others are predetermined variables. 
Equation (3.4) is the aggregate demand function for 
rea 1 income, VJh i ch represents the ou tpu t-pr ice 1 eve 1 
relationship implicit in the IS-LM diagram. Aggregate 
demand is negatively related to real interest rates. The 
lagged long-term real interest rate reflects the lagged 
effect of the interest rate on investment spending because 
there is usually a significant lead time between an 
investment decision and an investment expenditure. (ln M-
ln P) represents the real balance effect in logarithmic 
form. The time trend, t, accounts for technological change 
and the growth in capital stock and labor force. Lagged 
real income represents a persistent effect--an adjustment 
process for the goods marKet. 
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Equation (3.5) is the real money demand function. It 
is a direct relation to the conventional Goldfeld money 
demand equation. Real income is used to measure the volume 
of transactions in the economy. The interest rate measures 
the opportunity cost of money holdings. The lagged real 
balance implies that the actual real money holdings are 
adjusted to the desired level by a partial-adjustment 
mechanism, where (1 - f 4 ) is the partial adjustment 
coefficient of real money demand. 
Equation (3.3> is the money supply function specified 
above. Equation (3.1) is the Federal Reserve's reaction 
function specified above. The coefficients: h1 and h 6 are 
pol icy-controlled parameters. 
Equation (3.6) is the aggregate supply function. It 
embodies the natural rate notion that output supplied is 
affected only by the unanticipated inflation rate because 
individual suppliers cannot accurately distinguish general 
from relative price movements. 4 This equation is expressed 
in terms of a geometric distributed lag on the unanticipated 
inflation rates. In the steady state, real income is on its 
full-employment growth path and there is no expectational 
error in the inflation rate. The anticipated GNP price 
deflator can be expressed as 
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E<ln Ptllt) = &1 + &2 1t-1 + &3 ·** 't-1 + &4 ** '""t-1 
+ &5 1 n URt-1 + &6 1n Mt_ 1 
~d 
"' + &7 't + &8 zt 
"" + &9 Ht + &10 Ht-1 + &11 1 n pt-1 
+ &12 1 n yt-1 + &13 1 n yt-2 + &14 Ut--.lt-1 
"" 
,... 
+ & 15 BPt + &16 1 n G + t &17 1 n TAXt_-1 
+ &18 t (3.10) 
Ad A A 1\ A 
wher-e it' Zt' Ht' BPt' and ln Gt ar-e the expected values of 
the cur-r-ent exogenous var-iables i~, Zt' Ht' BPt' and ln Gt' 
r-espectively. The signs of &s may be negative. The details 
of equation <3.10> are explained in Appendix B. 
Equation (3.7) is the ter-m str-ucture equation. The 
long-ter-m inter-est r-ate responds to the shor-t-term interest 
r-ate with a geometr-ic distributed lag, and to the change in 
shor-t-term inter-est rate. Equation (3.8) is the Fisher-
equation for- r-eal interest. Equation (3.9) is the 
unemployment equation. The unemployment r·ate is r-elated to 
the cur-r-ent and 1 agged gr-owth rate of r-ea 1 income, the 
lagged r-eal money stocK, and the time tr-end. The time 
tr-end, t, accounts for the gr·owth in 1 abor- for-ce. 
The r-educed form of r-ea 1 income is 
·d Z H BP 
ln Yt = Y1 + Y2 ln Yt-1 + Y3 e~ + Y4 et + Ys et + Y6 et 
+ Y7 e~ + Ys e4,t + Yg es,t + Y1o e3,t 
+ Y11 e1,t + Y12 e6,t + Y13 e7,t + Y14 eg,t 
(3.11) 
y3 = <-d2g4j2K2-d2g4j2K3)/DEN 
y4 = <-d2g5j2K2-d2g5j2K3)/DEN 
Ys = (-d2g6j2K2-d2g6j2K3)/DEN 
y6 = <-d2g2h5J2K2-d2g2h5J2K3)/DEN 
y7 = <d5f3j2+d5g3j2)/DEN 
y = (f3j2+g3j2)/DEN 8 









The details of the derivation of equation <3.11) are in 
Appendix A. The pol icy-controlled parameters h 1 and h 6 do 
not a.ffec t rea 1 income. The equation imp 1 i es that no 
systematic short- or long-run effect because people will 
learn what the pol icy maKer is doing. Monetary pol icy can 
only be effective in the short run affecting economic 
activity through the disturbance term el,t" 
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Endnotes 
1The old Ml was redefined in February 1980. Adjustment 
was made for shifts to 11 other checkable depos i ts 11 from other 
assets to obtain a better measure of the underlying trend in 
M1. MlB was renamed M1 in January 1982. 
2Money market conditions come from measures of many 
types of markets: the government securities market, the 
market for corporate bonds, and the marKet for bank 
reserves. Treasury bill rates, dealer financing and 
inventories, the Federal Funds rate, and the reserve 
positions of banks are the measures of money market 
conditions. 
3There are at least four hypotheses used to explain the 
positive correlation between an unanticipated change in the 
money supply and interest rates [Cornell, 1983; Nichols, 
Small, and Webster, 1983J: 
(a) The expected inflation hypothesis states that an 
unanticipated change in the money supply alters an 
agent~s inflation expectation. Changes in long-term 
interest rates are less than those for short-term 
interest rates unless the change in expected inflation 
is permanent. 
(b) The Keynesian hypothesis states that an unanticipated 
increase in the money supply causes higher short-term 
interest rates <via the 1 iquidity effect with rigid 
prices) because an anticipated offsetting action is 
taken by the Federal Reserve. Under the 
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reserve-aggregate approach, short-term interest rates 
may be expected to rise more. 
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(c) The real activity hypothesis states that an 
unanticipated increase in the money supply sign~ls 
greater money demand and higher expected future output. 
Real interest rate must rise to clear the product market 
and the money market if the adjustment in prices were 
slow and if expansionary monetary pol icy were not taken; 
in turn, nominal interest rates increase. 
(d) The risk premium hypothesis states that an unanticipated 
increase in the money supply reveals the rise in 
aggregate risk aversion and the riskiness of competing 
assets, leading to an increase in the risk premium. 
4rhis aggregate supply function is also consistent with 





In this chapter, the Federal Reserve's reaction 
functions, the money supply function, a small 
macroeconometric model, and the anticipated GNP price 
deflator equation are estimated. The estimating techniques 
are as follows. 
<1> Reaction functions, the money supply function, and the 
anticipated price equation: 
Since the lagged dependent variable is present in 
reaction functions--equations (4.1> and (4.2) below--and the 
anticipated price equation--equation (4.12>--the Durbin h 
statistic is used to test the null hypothesis of no 
first-order serial correlation against the alternative 
hypothesis that first-order serial correlation is present. 1 
The Durbin h statistic is approximately normally distributed 
with zero mean and unit variance; the critical value of the 
standardized normal distribution is 1.645 for one-tailed 
test at the 5 percent significance level. For the money 
supply function, equation <4.3>, the Durbin-Watson statistic 
<DW> is used to test for first-order serial correlation. If 
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the DW statistic is less than 1.57, positive fi~st-o~de~ 
se~ial co~~elation is p~esent at the 5 pe~cent significance 
level. The AUTOREG p~ocedu~e, a gene~al ized 1east-squa~es 
method, is also used to test fo~ higher-o~de~ se~ial 
co~~elation CSAS, 1982]. The p~esence of se~ial co~~elation 
affects the efficiency of o~dinary least-squa~es ~eg~ession 
estimates; i.e., the va~iances of the estimated pa~ameters 
a~e not the minimum variances. 
The Goldfeld-Quandt test is used to test the null 
hypothesis of homoscedasticity againsl the alte~native 
hypothesis that hete~oscedasticity is present. The test 
statistic is the F statistic. The critical value with 43 
degrees of f~eedom in the nume~ato~ and the denominator is 
1.68 at the 5 percent significance level and 2.08 at the 1 
percent significance level. When hete~oscedasticity is 
present, o~dinary least-squares parameter estimates are 
inefficient and the estimated va~iances of the estimated 
pa~ameters a~e biased. 
The co~~elation coefficients mat~ix of the independent 
variables is used to checK for multico11 inea~ity. If 
multicollinearity exists, o~dina~y least-squa~es pa~amete~ 
estimates are inefficient. However, multico11 inearity does 
not cause p~oblems if the standa~d er~o~s of the estimated 
coefficients are low [PindycK and Rubinfeld, 62, p. 90], 
Since explanatory endogenous va~iables a~e included in 
equations (4.1>, (4.2), and <4.3)~ the independent variables 
a~e co~~elated with the er~o~ term (i.e., they have a 
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nonzero covariances>. In this case, ordinary least-squares 
estimates of the regression parameters are biased and 
inconsistent. Therefore, these equations are estimated 
using instrumental-variables estimation to obtain consistent 
parameter estimates. The instrumental variable, which is 
both highly correlated with the endogenous explanatory 
variable and uncorrelated with the error term in the 
equation, replaces the endogenous explanatory variable. For 
equation (4.3>, the AUTOREG procedure is also used to 
correct for serial correlation. The method used in AUTOREG 
is the two-step full transform method using the 
least-squares residuals to estimate the covariances across 
observations. Equation <4.12) is estimated using ordinary 
least-squares estimation. 
(2) The macroeconometric model: 
The model is estimated by the three-stage least-squares 
<3SLS) technique because (a) it is an overidentified case, 
(b) disturbances across equations are correlated, <c> the 
sample is large, and (d) 3SLS uses all available 
information. When explanatory endogenous variables are 
included and disturbances across equations are correlated, 
ordinary least-squares estimates are biased, inconsistent, 
and inefficient. Since serial correlation among 
disturbances of some equations exists and lagged endogenous 
variables are included, 2SLS estimates are biased, 
inconsistent and inefficient, but they are asymptotically 
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efficient. 2 3SLS is the full-information estimation, it 
estimates the entire simultaneous-equation system using all 
information available on each equation. In the first stage, 
ordinary least-squares procedure is performed to regress 
each explanatory endogenous variable on all predetermined 
variables in the model. In the second stage, ordinary 
least-squares procedure is used to regress each endogenous 
variable on the predicted values of the explanatory 
endogenous variables obtained from the first stage and the 
predetermined variables included in each equation. In the 
third stage, the generalized least-squares procedure is 
applied to 2SLS to improve efficiency. 3SLS is 
asymptotically more efficient than 2SLS. These estimates 
have the same asymptotic properties as estimates in a 
classical regression model. Although 3SLS is sensitive to 
both specification error and measurement error, most of the 
root-mean-square simulation errors of endogenous variables 
in the model using 3SLS are lower than those using 2SLS. 
The corrected R2 <R2> is used as a measure of goodness 
of fit to the regression. The F statistic is used to test 
the null hypothesis that none of the explanatory variables 
helps to explain the variation of the dependent variable 
about its mean. A high value of the F statistic implies 
that the null hypothesis is rejected. The t statistic (in 
parenthesis below the regression coefficient> is used to 
test the significance of the parameter estimates. The 
critical value of the t statistic with 120 degrees of 
freedom is 1.98 at the 5 percent significance level, or 
1.658 at the 10 percent significance level. An ex post 
dynamic simulation over the 1953:3-1984:2 time period is 
performed to evaluate how well the model tracKs each 
endogenous variab1e.3 
The dynamic multipliers for each endogenous variable 
resulting from changes in the pol icy-controlled parameters 
are examined to test the effectiveness of monetary pol icy. 
The impact, interim, and total multipliers for each 
endogenous variable resulting from about a 0.1 increase in 
the parameter of the constant term, h 1 , and a 0.1 decrease 
in the parameter of the lagged dependent variable, h 6 , of 
the reaction function are calculated. For example, the 
dynamic multipliers of real income, ln yt where t = 1. .. T, 
are calculated in the following way. The model is first 
dynamically simulated for the period 1953:3-1984:2. The 
,... 
predicted values of ln Yt from this simulation is ln Yt· 
Another simulation is then run for the same period using 
different values for the pol icy-controlled parameters <h 1 
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and h 6>, respectively. The predicted values from the second 
s i mu 1 at i on i s 1 n y t. ,... These predicted values, ln yt and 
A ln Yt_, are compared to get the impact, interim, and total 
multipliers. The impact multipliers are obtained from (ln Yi 
"" - ln Y1>. They measure the first period effects on real 
income of changes in the pol icy-controlled parameters. The 
interim multipliers are obtained from [(ln y~- ln yt) -
A A (ln Y* - ln Y )l, and they measure the subsequent period 
t-1 t-1 
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by period effects on rea 1 income of changes in the 
policy-controlled parameters. The total multipliers are 
"'* .... obtained from (ln yT- ln yT). These are measures of the 
cumu 1 at i ve effects on rea 1 income of changes in the 
pol icy-controlled parameters ( i • e., the sum of the interim 
multipliers>. 
The details of data sources are explained in Appendix 
C. All equations are estimated using quarterly (seasonally 
adjusted> data over the period, 1953:1-1984:2. 
Estimated Results 
Reaction Functions 
The reaction function relating Federal Reserve open 
marKet operations to pol icy goals is estimated as 
1 n URt = - 0.0640 + 0.1355 <UN - UN 1> (-0.96) (3.09) t t-
+ 0.0745 <ln yt - ln Yt_1 > (0.25) 
- 0.4236 Cln Pt- ln Pt_1> - 0.0004 BPt (-0.46> (-0.32) 
+ 1.0208 ln UR + e 
(44.88) t-1 1,t 
( 4. 1 ) 
F = 4211.62 R'2 = 0.9942 
Based on the Durbin h statistic <1.3979) and the statistics 
of the AUTOREG procedure--the t values of the parameters of 
previous error terms; no serial correlation exists at the 5 
percent significance level. The Go1dfeld-Quandt test 
statistic is 1.1340; homoscedasticity is present at the 5 
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percent significance level. Multicollinearity is present. 
Ther-e is high negative correlation between <UNt - UNt_ 1 > and 
(ln Yt- ln Yt_1 >, their correlation coefficient is 
- 0.7606. Also, there is high positive correlation between 
coefficient is 0.7733. This equation is estimated using 
instrumental-variables estimation.4 The lagged unemployment 
rate, UNt_ 1 , is used as the instrumental variable for UNt. 
Most predetermined variables in the model are used as a 
combination of instruments for ln yt and ln Pt' 
respective1y. 5 The order of explanation cR2> is very high. 
All of the signs agree with expectations. The FOMC~s 
response to the change in unemployment rate is highly 
significant. 
An alternative reaction function relating Federal 
Reserve open marKet operations to intermediate target 
variables is estimated as 
1 n URt =- 0.0597- 0.0033 <it- it-1> 
(-1.77) (-1.02) 
- 0.3998 01 ·(ln Mt- ln Mt-1> + 1.0217 ln URt-1 
(-1.42) (93.68) 
- 0.0199 D2 + e 2 ,t (-2.95) 
F = 5456.33 
(4.2) 
'R 2 = o.9944 
The Durbin h statistic (0.1362) and the statistics of the 
AUTOREG procedure show that no serial correlation exists at 
the 5 percent significance level. The Goldfeld-Quandt test 
statistic is 1.7734; homoscedasticity is. pr-esent at the 1 
percent significance level. Multicollinearity is present. 
There is high positive correlation between Ol•(ln Mt-
ln Mt_ 1> and ln URt_1 , their correlation coefficient is 
0.7308. This equation is estimated using instrumental-
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variables estimation. The discount rate, .d It' is used as the 
instrumental variable for it. Most predetermined variables 
in the model are used as a combination of instruments for 
ln Mt. 6 The order of explanation <R 2 ) is very high. All 
coefficients have the expected signs. The significant 
coefficient of 02 indicates that the Federal Reserve has had 
a better control over the money stocK since 1979:4 because 
the nonborrowed reserves are less than before. 
The Money Supply Function 
The estimated money supply function is 
ln M = 2.7272 + 1.0885 ln URt + 0.0514 i - 0.0273 id 
t (9.71) (16.00) (1.78) t (-0.80) t 
- 0.0614 Z - 3.8087 <Ht- Ht_1> + 0.2415 03 ( -4. 92) t ( -2.40) ( 8. 07) 
+ e 3 ,t (4.3) 
e 3 t = 0 • 6948 e t-1 + v t 
, (10.71) 
F = 1078. 12 R2 = 0.9371 
v..•here v t is the random disturbance term v..•h i ch is assumed 
independently normally distributed with zero mean and finite 
variance. Based on the DW statistic (0.5230) and the 
statistics of the AUTOREG procedure, positive first-order 
serial correlation is present at the 5 percent significance 
level. The Goldfeld-Quandt test statistic is 1.1792; 
homoscedasticity is present at the 5 percent significance 
level. Multicollinearity is present. The correlation 
coefficient for it and i~ is 0.9895. This equation is 
estimated using instrumental-variables estimation first. 
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Most predetermined variables in the model are used as a 
combination of instruments for ln URt. 7 ln URt-1' (ln Mt-1 
-ln Pt_1 ), ln Yt_1 , UNt_1 , ln Gt, and i~ are used as a 
combination of instruments for it· Then, the AUTOREG 
procedure is used to correct for serial correlation. The 
order of explanation (R 2) is high. All signs of regression 
coefficients are consistent with expectations. All 
coefficients except that of the discount rate are 
significant at the 10 percent level. 
The Small Macroeconometric Model 
with Rational Expectations 
The notation for the model~s variables is the 
following: 
= short-term nominal interest rate 
' i** = long-term nominal interest rate 
r** = long-term real interest rate 
id = the discount rate of the Federal Reserve Bank 
UR = nonborrowed reserves 
M = the nominal money stocK 
Z =the reserve requirement for demand deposits 
H = the ratio of currency held by the public to the 
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money stock 
P = GNP price deflator 
y = real GNP 
UN= unemployment rate 
BP =real balance on current account 
G = real government purchases of goods and services 
TAX= real net receipts of government 
t = the time trend 
01 =dummy variable, takes the value of 1 after 1969:4 and 
zero otherwise 
02 = dummy v~riable, takes the value of 1 after 1979:3 and· 
zero otherwise 
03 = dummy variable, takes the value of 1 after 1982:2 and, 
zero otherwise 
This model is estimated using 3SLS as follows: 
ln y = 0.4931 + 0.0067 r** 
t (3.53) (3.47) t 
- 0.0046 r** - 0.0042 r** 
(-1.83) t-1 (-2.77) t-2 
+ 0.0299 (ln Mt - ln Pt) + 0.0332 ln Gt 
( 1 • 74) ( 2. 98) 
- 0.0474 ln TAXt_1 + 0.0010 t + 0.9321 ln Yt_ 1 (-2.44) (5.48) (27.25) 
<ln Mt- ln Pt> 
F = 18942.45 
(4.4) 
'R2 = 0.9991 
= - 0.1492 + 0.0337 ln yt + 0.0003 it 
(-4.04) (4.65) (0.27) 
- 0.0026 it-1 
(-2.23) 
+ 0.9105 (ln Mt_ 1 - ln Pt-1> + es,t (37.25) 
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F = 1041.87 
(4.5) 
'R 2 = 0.9716 
ln Mt = 2.5533 + 1.0905 1n URt + 0.0426 it- 0.0205 i~ 
(15.49) (29.50) (2.98) (-1.26) 
- 0.0518 Z - 1.8059 <Ht- Ht_ 1> + 0.4018 03 (-6.31) t (-0.70) (17.44) 
F = 1015.93 
(4.6) 
'R 2 = 0.9803 
ln URt = 0.1084- 0.0169 <UNt- UNt_ 1> ( 2. 46) ( -1 • 80) 
. ** 
't = 
- 0.5164 <ln yt- ln yt_ 1 ) (-1.15) 
+ 1.3401 (ln Pt- ln Pt_1>- 0.0018 BP (1.96) (-1.64) t 
+ 0.9653 ln URt_1 + e 7 ,t ( 62. 19) 
F = 3633.62 
+ 0.9988 ln y + e 8 ,t (295.18) t- 1 
F = 43116.22 
(4.7) 
'R2 = 0.9933 
(4.8) 
"R 2 = 0.9986 
0. 0795 + 0 .1150 it + 0. 1890 (it - i t-1) 
(1.30) (5.48) (5.42) 
+ 0.8938 i~~l + e 
(37.22) 
F = 4581.90 
(4.9) 
'R 2 = 0.9912 
(4.10) 
= 0.8623- 15.6317 <ln Y - ln Yt_ 1 > 
<1.85) (-4.36) t 
- 16.9019 <ln Yt_ 1 - ln Yt_ 2 > (-7.22) 
- 7.7290 <ln yt_ 2 - ln Yt_ 3 > (-3.81) 
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- 0.4416 <ln Mt_ 1 - ln Pt_1 > + 0.0006 t (-0.76) (0.55) 
+ 0.9651 UNt-l + e1 l,t (49.88) 
F = 1066.67 
(4.11) 
"R2 = 0.9813 
These values ofF and R2 are from the results of 2SLS. 
The anticipated GNP price deflator is estimated as:. 
~d ,.. ,.. 
where It' Zt, Ht' 
·** 0.5433 + 0.0019 it-1 + 0.0545 't-1 
( -1 . 0 9) ( 3. 21 ) ( 0 • 56) 
** 0.0562 rt_ 1 + 0.0284 ln URt_ 1 (-0.58) (3.16) 
':'d ,.. 
+ 0.0770 ln Mt_ 1 + 0.2171 't - 0.0339 Z (2.55) (2.24) (-1.46) t 
A 
- 0.2421 Ht + 0.1353 Ht_ 1 + 1.0073 ln Pt_1 
< -o . 53> < 1 . 1 5 > < 36. 24 > 
+ 0.0042 ln yt_ 1 - 0.0635 ln Yt_ 2 (0.10) (-1.43) 
A A 
- 0.0015 UNt_ 1 - 0.0005 BPt + 0.1618 ln Gt ( -1 . 24) ( -1 . 69) . ( 2. 19) 
- 0.0154 ln TAXt_ 1 - 0.0189 t (-0.95) (-2.44) 
(4.12) 
F = 99999.99 -2 R = 0.9999 
A A 
BPt, and 1 n Gt are the expected values of 
the current exogenous variables: .d It' zt, Ht' BPt' and 1 n Gt' 
r·espectively.8 The Durbin h statistic is 0.7958; no 
positive first-order serial correlation exists at the 5 
percent significance level. The Goldfeld-Quandt test 
statistic is 1.8825 which is less than the critical value 
F40 , 40 = 2.11 at the 1 percent significance level; 
homoscedasticity is present. This equation is estimated 
using ordinary least-squares. 
58 
In equation <4.4), all coefficients are significant at 
the 1 0 percent 1 eve 1 • A 1 1 s i gn s of c oe f f i c i en t s except that 
of the current 1 ong-term real interest rate are consistent 
with expectations. Empirically, aggregate demand is 
negative 1 y re 1 a ted to the 1 agged 1 ong-term rea 1 interest 
-
rates. The positive sign of the current long-term real 
interest rate reflects the procycl ical movements in real 
'income and the 1 ong-term rea 1 interest rate. 
In equation <4.5), all the parameter estimates (except 
that of the current short-term interest rate) have the same 
signs as those expected, and are significant at the 5 
percent level. Empirically, real money demand is negatively 
related to the one lagged short-term interest rate, but not 
the current short-term interest rate. The adjustment 
coefficient of demand for real balance is 0.0895, which 
means that the adjustment between the desired and the actual 
demand for real balances is low. 
All the parameter estimates of equation (4.6) have the 
same signs as those expected. The paramet-er estimates of 
equations <4.3) and (4.6) are different because different 
estimating techniques are used. Some coefficients of 
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equation (4.7> do not have the same signs as those expected. 
The reason is that the instrumental variable for UNt used in 
the first stage of 3SLS is a combination of all 
predetermined variables in the model, which is different 
from that used in equation (4.1>. However, the one 
instrument--UNt-l used in equation <4.1) has the highest 
correlation with UNt. The pol icy-controlled parameters in 
equation (4.7) are significant at the 5 percent level. 
In equation (4.8>, all of the signs are consistent with 
expectations. The coefficient of the unanticipated 
inflation rate is significant at the 5 percent level. There 
exists a short-run trade off between unemployment and the 
unanticipated inflation rate. All the coefficients of 
~quation (4.9) have the correct signs consistent with 
expectations, and are significant (except for the constant 
term) at the 5 percent 1 eve 1 • 
In equation <4.11>, all of the signs agree with 
expectations. The unemployment rate is significantly 
negatively related to the current and the lagged growth 
rates of real income at the 5 percent 1 evel. 
Based on the values ofF and R2, each equation fits the 
data well. The weighted R2 for the model is 0.9965, which 
corresponds to the approximate F test on all non-intercept 
parameters in the model [SAS, 1982]. The overall 
statistical fit of the model is good. 
An ex post dynamic simulation over the 1953:3-1984:2 
time period is performed. The statistics of fit of each 
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endogenous variable are 1 isted in Table I. The 
root-mean-square simulation error <rmse) measures the 
deviation of the simulated variable from its actual time 
path, or the estimate of the standard deviation of the error 
term. The rmse of each endogenous variable is compared with 
its mean. Real income, prices, the money stocK, and 
nonborrowed reserves each has a small rmse. The historical 
simulation of each endogenous variable is shown on Figures 
1-8. The estimated equations of real income, prices, and 
the money stocK <Figures 1, 5, and 6) tracK the actual 
behavior quite well. Those equations of interest rates 
<Figures 2, 3, and 4) do not have good simulation fit; 
however, they generally duplicate the turning points in the 
'historical data. The simulated series of nonborrowed 
reserves and unemployment rate (Figures 7 and 8) do 
reproduce the general long-run behavior of their actual 
series, although some turning points are missed and the 





variable mean rmse 
ln y 6.9172 0.0635 
r** 6.0159 1. 9207 
i** 6.0012 1. 9220 
5.3470 2.0296 
ln p 4.5679 0.0036 
ln M 5.3664 0.0569 
1 n UR 3.2559 0.1210 
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Three-Month Treasury Bill Rate, i 
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The Dynamic Response of the Model 
Changes in the pol icy-controlled parameters affect the 
real and nominal magnitudes through the economic system. 
The dynamic multipliers for each endogenous variable are 
calculated by changing the parameter of the constant term in 
the reaction function--equation (4.7)--from 0.1084 to 0.2000 
first with other things being equal, and then changing the 
parameter of the lagged dependent variable in equation <4.7) 
from 0.9653 to 0.8600 with other things being equal. The 
first observations of the dynamic multipliers start from 
1953:4 since the lagged endogenous variables are included in 
the model. The impact and the total multipliers for each 
endogenous variable resulting from changes in 
pol icy-controlled parameters are 1 isted in Table II. The 
) 
J ih ter,j m mu 1 tip 1 i ers are shown on Figures 9-24. On these 
figures, some observations are hidden. 
Monetary actions have an immediate effect and a 
cumulative effect on each endogenous variable, and these 
effects depend on the size of changes in pol icy-controlled 
parameters. The oscillatory movements of the interim 
multipliers are around zero. And most signs of the impact 
multipliers and total multipliers of endogenous variables 
are opposite. These suggest that the first period effect 
and most of the subsequent period by period effects on 
endogenous variables of changes in the pol icy-controlled 
parameters genera 11 y do not support the ore t i ca 1 expectations 
because the endogenous variables have interacted. Only the 
71 
cumulative effects are consistent with theoretical rational 
expectations. In general, expansionary pol icy increases the 
money stocK, prices, and r·ea 1 income in the short run, i t 
also dec:r·eases the unemployment rate and interest rates. 
There exists a short-run Phi11 ips relations. The model 
shows that, over the entire period, the influence of money 
on money income falls on real income and on prices. Since 
all interim multipliers exhibit an oscillatory movement 
around zero, this is a stable model. Only the interim 
multiplier·s of real income and the unemployment rate 
(Figures 9, 16, 17, and 24) exhibit a damped oscillatory 
movement and tend to converge to zero. This implies that 
monetary policy cannot affect real income and the 
unemployment rate in the long run, but can affect all other 
'· 
e~dogenous variables. These results suggest that monetary 
policy is effective in the short run, but ineffective in the 
long run. However, the empirical evidence does not support 
the view that monetary pol icy cannot affect the real 
interest rate in the long run. 
• 
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TABLE I I 
DYNAMIC MULTIPLIERS OF CHANGES IN 
POLICY-CONTROLLED PARAMETERS 
r-estrict hl=0.2000 r-estrict h6=0.8600 
variable impact total impact total 
mu 1 tip 1 i er mu 1 tip 1 i er mu 1 tip 1 i er mu 1 tip 1 i er 
1 n y -0.0001 0.0124 -0.0001 0.0347 
** 0.0266 -0 .1844 0.0779 -0.2998 r 
i ** 0.0266 -0. 1847 0.0779 -0.3005 
0.0869 -0.0076 0.2569 0.2196 
1 n p -0.0001 0.0002 -0.0001 0.0004 
1 n M 0.0001 0.0092 0.0003 0.0221 
1 n UR -0.00:20 0.0062 -0.0070 0.0017 
UN 0.0039 -0.4921 0.0106 -1.2498 
note: h 1 represents the parameter of the constant term in 
equation (4. 7). 
h6 represents the parameter of the lagged dependent 
variable in equation (4.7). 
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1when the lagged endogenous variable is present, the 
Durbin-Watson <DW) statistic is no 1 onger useful in testing 
for serial correlation because the DW statistic is often 
close to 2 even when the errors are serially correlated 
[Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1981]. 
2Positive first-order serial correlation is present in 
equations (4 •• ), (4.8), and (4.11) at the 5 percent 
significance level. Fifth-order serial correlation is 
present in equation <4.5) at the 5 percent significance 
level. Lagged en~ogenous variables are included in these 
equations. 
3Since the lagged endogenous variables are involved in 
the model, the first observation of dynamic simulation 
starts from 1953:4. 
4The coefficient of ln URt_ 1 is less than 1 if the 
constant term of equation (4.1) is restricted to be zero. 
Also, it is less than 1 in 3SLS estimates. 
Sit-1' ~::l' ln URt-1' (ln Mt-1 ~ ln pt-1)' 
(Ht- Ht_1>, 1n Yt_ 1 , ln yt_ 2 , 1n Yt_3 , UNt_1 , BPt, ln Gt, 
ln TAXt_ 1, ln Pt_1 , ln Pt_2, t, i~, and Zt are used as a 
combination of instruments for ln yt and ln Pt' 
respectively. 
6The combination of instruments for ln Mt is the same 
as that for 1 n y t or 1 n P t. 
7The combination of instruments for ln URt is the same 
as that for ln Yt or ln Pt. 
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8Most expected values of the current exogenous 
variables are estimated by an integrated 
autoregressive-moving average (ARIMA> model. The 
ARIMA<p,d,q) model is (7,1,1> for i~, (10,1,2> for Zt' 
(1,2,1> for Ht' and (14,2,0> for ln Gt. BPt is estimated by 
BPt-l because it is a random walk with white noise. 
CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
In this paper, the Federal Reserve open marKet 
operations are used as a pol icy instrument to examine the 
Federal Reserve behavior. Based on the ualues of the F 
statistic and the corrected R2 of reaction functions, 
equations <4.1) and (4.2>, the evidence is strong that the 
Federal Reserve reacts to pol icy goals or intermediate 
targets. The monetary authority has acted countercyclically 
in the sense that the nonborrowed reserves is negatively 
related to the inflation rate and real balance on current 
account, and is positively related to the change in the 
unemployment rate; or is negatively related to the change in 
interest rates and the growth r~te of the money stocK. 
However, among these target variables, only the coefficient 
of the change in the unemployment rate is significant at the 
5 percent 1 eve 1 • In equation ( 4. 2), nonborro~A•ed reserves 
are negatively related to the growth rate of the money stocK 
since 1970. The empirical results do not support the 
proposition that the Federal Reserve is responsible for the 
procycl ical growth of the money stocK since 1970. The 
significant parameter estimate of the dummy variable, 02, in 
equation (4.2) indicates that the adoption of a 
91 
reserve-aggregate approach to monetary control in October 
1979 has had a significant effect on the Federal Reserve 
behavior. 
92 
Theoretically and empirically, the money stock is 
endogenously determined by actions of the monetary 
authority, the banKing system, and the pub1 ic. The 
significant parameter estimate of the dummy variable, D3~ in 
equation (4.3) indicates that the movements of the money 
stock were significantly affected by financial innovation 
and deregulation in the early 19~Ds. 
The dynamic response of the small macroeconometric 
model to changes in pol icy-controlled parameters is analyzed 
to test the effectiveness of monetary pol icy. The impact, 
interim, and total multipliers for each -endogenous variable 
indicate that changes in pol icy actions disturb the system 
in the short run because the inability of agents to 
distinguish between real and nominal shifts. Based on the 
interim mu1tip1 iers of real income and the unemployment 
rate, it is suggested that monetary pol icy is neutral in the 
long run. The effects of the unanticipated pol icy changes 
on real and nominal magnitudes depend on the size of pol icy 
changes. In the short run, an increase in nonborrowed 
reserves increases the money stocK, prices, and real income; 
it also decreases interest rates and the unemployment rate. 
There exists a short-run Phillips relation. From Figures 2 
and 3 and from the dynamic multipliers, the fluctuations in 
long-term real and nominal interest rates are almost the 
93 
same which implies that the unanticipated inflation rate is 
small. 
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APPENDIX A 
THE DERIVATION OF THE REDUCED FORM 
OF REAL INCOME 
Substituting equation (3.11) into <3.7) to eliminate UNt 
yields 
ln URt = <h 1+h 2s 1 ) + h 6 ln URt_1 - h 2s 4 ln Mt_1 - h 4 ln Pt 
+ <h 4+h 2s 4) ln Pt-1 + (h3-h2s2) ln Yt 
+ <h2s2-h2s3-h3) 1n Yt-1 + h2s3 ln Yt-2 
+ (h2s6-h2) UNt-1- hs BPt + h2s5 t + e1,t 
+ h2 e9,t <A .1) 
Substituting equation <A.1) into (3.6) to eliminate ln URt 
gives 
ln Mt = <g 1+g 2h 1+g 2h 2s 1+g 7D3) + g 3 it+ g 2h 6 ln URt_1 
h 1 M .d Z H + H 
- g2 2s4 n t-1 - 94 1 t- 9s t- g6 t g6 t-1 
- g2h4 1 n Pt + <g2h4+g2h2s4) 1 n Pt-1 
+ (g2h3-g2h2s2) ln Yt + Cg2h2s2-g2h2s3-g2h3) ln Yt-1 
+ g2h2s3 ln Yt-2 + <g2h2s6-g2h2) UNt-1 - g2hs BPt 
+ g 2h 25 5 t + e 3 , t + 9 2 e 1, t + 9 2h 2 e 9 , t <A. 2) 
Substituting equation (3.9) into (3.10) to eliminate i~* 
yields 
r~* = 1<1 + (1<2+1<3) it- 1<3 it-1 + 1<4 i:~1- E<ln Pt 11t) 
<A.3> 




ln yt = (dl-d2Kl) - (d2K2+d2K3) it + d2K3 it-1 - d2K4 i~:l 
- d 3 r~~l + d 4 ln Mt + d 2 E<ln Ptllt) - d4 ln Pt 
- d 2 ln Pt-l + d8 ln Yt-l + d5 ln Gt - d6 ln TAXt-l 
+ d7 t + •4,t - d2 e7,t <A.4) 
Let equation <A. 2> = (3.5) solve for it 
it= 0.1 + a2 1 n URt-1 + a3 1n Mt-l + a4 
+ a7 Ht-1 + aa ln Pt + ag ln Pt-1 + a1o 1 n Yt 
+ 
all 1n y 1 t- + al2 1 n yt-2 + al3 UNt-1 + al4 BPt 
+ 
al5 t + a e + a e + alB e + al9 e 16 S,t 17 3,t l,t 9,t 
<A.5) 
where al = (fl-gl-g2hl-g2h2sl-g703)/DEN1 
a2 = - g 2h 6/DEN1 
a3 = <f 4+g2h 2s 4 >/DEN1 
a4 = g 4/DEN1 
as = g 5/0EN1 
a6 = g 6/DEN1 
a = - g 6/DEN1 7 
a a = <1+g2h 4 >/DEN1 
ag = - <f 4+g 2h 4 +g2h 2s 4 )/DEN1 
a1o= <f 2-g2h 3+g2h 2s 2 >/DEN1 
all= (g2h3-g2h2s2+g2h2s3)/DEN1 
a12= - g 2h 2s 3/DEN1 
Otl3= <g 2h 2-g2h 2s 6 )/DEN1 
a14= g 2h 5/DEN1 
als= - g 2h 2s 5/DEN1 
a16= 1/DEN1 
Ctl T - 1/DENl 
a18= - g2/DEN1 
a1 9= - g 2h 2/DEN1 
DEN! = f 3+g3 
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Substituting equation <A.5) into <A.4) to eliminate it, and 
then equating to equation (3.8) solves for ln Pt: 
0 B . ** ** 1 UR ln Pt = ~1 + 2 it-1 + 83 1t-l + B4 rt-1 + 85 n t-1 
+ 86 ln Mt + 87 ln Mt-1 + Ba i~ + Bg 2t + 810 Ht 
+ 811 Ht-1 + 1312 1 n pt-1 + 813 E< 1 n pt I It) 
+ 814 ln Yt-1 + 815 ln yt-2 + 816 UNt-1 + 817 BPt 
+ 818 ln Gt + 819 ln TA><t-1 + B2o t: + B21 e4,t 
+ 822 eS,t + 823 e3,t + 824 el,t + 82s e6,t 
+ 82 6 e7 , t + 82 7 eg , t 
/DEN2 
B2 = d2 1<3/DEN2 
83 = - ~ K4 /DEN2 
84 = - d3 /DEN2 
8s = < -a2 ~ K2 -~ ~ K3 ) /DEN2 
86 = d4/DEN2 
87 = <-a3d2K2-a3 d2 1< 3 >/DEN2 
Ba = (-et4d2K 2-a4d2K3 >/DEN2 
Bg = (-a5 d2K2-a5 d2K3 >/DEN2 
13lo= <-a6d2K2-a6d2K3 )/DEN2 
1311= (-a7d2K2-a7d2K3 >/DEN2 
1312= <-d2-a9d2K2-a9d2K3 >/DEN2 
813= ( d2 +j2 +alO d2 j2 K2 +alO d2 j2 K3 )/DEN2 
(A. 6) 
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61s= ( -a12 d2 K2 -a12 d2 K3 )/DEN2 
616= (-a13d2K2-a13 d2K3 >/DEN2 
617= ( -a14 d2 K2 -a14 d2 K3 )/DEN2 
61s= d5/DEN2 
619= - d6/DEN2 
62o= <d7-a15 d2K2-a15 d2K3 >/DEN2 
621= 1/DEN2 
6227 (-a16 d2K2-a16 d2K3 >/DEN2 
623= ( -a17 d2 k2 -a17 d2 K3 )/DEN2 
624= (-a18 d2K3 -a18 d2K3 >/DEN2 
62s= ( -1-a10 d2 K2 -a10 d2 K3 )/DEN2 
626= - d2/DEN2 
627= ( -a19 d2 K2 -a19 d2 k3 )/DEN2 
DEN2 = d4+j2+a8d2k2+a8d2K3+a10d2j2K2+a10d2j2K3 
The conditional mathematical expectation of ln Pt is 
E<ln Ptllt> = 61 + 62 it_1 + 63 i~: 1 + 64 r~: 1 + 65 ln URt_1 
~d l + 6 6 E ( 1 n Mt I It ) + 6 7 1 n Mt _1 + 6 8 It + 6 9 t 
"" + 610 Ht + 611 Ht-1 + 612 ln pt-1 
+ 613 E( 1 n Pt I It) + 614 1 n Yt-1 + 6 1S 1 n Yt-2 
A A 
+ 616 UNt-1 + 617 BPt + 618 ln Gt 
+ 619 ln TAxt_1 + 620 t <A.7> 
Subtracting equation (A.7> from (A.6) yields 
id Z H BP 
ln Pt- E<ln Ptiit> = 6s et + 6g et + 610 et + 617 et 
G 
+ 618 et + 621 e4,t + 622 es,t 




Substituting equation <A.8) into (3.8) gives 
ln Yt = Yl + Y2 ln Yt-1 + Y3 etd + Y4 et + Ys e~ + Y6 e~p 
+ OG + + + + 8 Y7 ~t Ys e4,t Yg eS,t Y10 e3,t Y11 ~l,t 
<A.9> 
APPENDIX B 
THE ANTICIPATED GNP PRICE DEFLATOR EQUATION 
Substituting equations (A.S> and (3.8) into (A.2) yields 
ln Mt = 61 + 62 ln URt-1 + 63 ln Mt-1 + 64 i~ + 65 Zt + 66 Ht 
+ 07 Ht-1 + oa ln Pt + og ln Pt-1 + 610 E<ln Ptlit> 
+ 611 ln Yt-1 + o12 ln Yt-2 + o13 UNt-1 + o14 BPt 
<B. 1 > 
where 0 1 = 91+g2h1+g2h2s1-g2h2s2j1+g2h3j1+g3a1+g3a10j1+g7D3 
0 2 = 92h6+g3a2 
0 3 = -g2h2s4+g3a3 
0 4 = g3a4-g4 
0 5 = g3a5-g5 
0 6 = g3a6-g6 
0 7 = 9 3al9 6 
0 8 = -g2h 2s2j 2+g2h3j 2-g2h4+g3aa+g3a10j 2 






61s= g 2h 25 5+g 3a15 
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et = g3a16 e5,t + <t+g3a17> •3,t + <g2+g3a18> e1,t 
+ (-g2h2s2+g2h3+g3a1o> e6,t + <g2h2+g3a19> e9,t 
The conditional mathematical expectation of ln Mt is 
Ad A 
E<ln Mtllt> = 61 + 62 ln URt_1 + 63 ln Mt_1 + 64 it+ 65 Zt 
A 
+ 66 Ht + 67 Ht_1 + 6g ln Pt_1 
+ <6 8+6 10 > E<ln Ptiit> + 611 ln Yt-1 
" + 612 ln Yt-2 + 613 UNt-1 + 614 8Pt + 615 t 
(8.2) 
Substituting equation (8.2) into <A.7) gives 
E<ln Pt 11 t> = &1 + &2 it-1 + &3 it~1 + &4 rt~1 + &5 ln URt-1 
+ &6 ln Mt-1 + &7 ~~ + &8 Zt + &g Ht + &10 Ht-1 
+ &11 ln Pt-1 + &12 ln Yt-1 + &13 ln Yt-2 
A 
+ &14 UNt-1 + &15 8Pt + &16 
+ &17 ln TAXt_1 + &18 t (8.3) 
where &1 = < 13 1 + 13 6 61 > /DEN3 
&2 = 13 2/DENS 
&3 = 13 3/DEN3 
&4 = 13 4/DEN3 
&5 = < 13 5+ 136 62 >/DENa 
&6 = ( 13 6 63+ 13 7 )/0EN3 
&7 = < 13664+138>/DEN3 
&8 = < 13 6 65+ 13 9 )/DEN3 
&g = < 13 6 66+ 1310 >/DEN3 
&1o= ( 136 67+ 611 )/DEN3 
&11= < 13 6 69+ 13 12 >/DEN3 
&12= < 136611 + 1314)/0EN3 
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-&14= <B 6o13 +s16 )/DEN3 
-&15= <B 6o14 +s17 )/DEN3 
-&16= s 18./DEN3 
-&17= s 19/DEN3 
-&18= <B 6o15+s 20 >/DEN3 
DEN3 = t-B6oa-B6°1o-B13 
APPENDIX C 
DATA SOURCES 
UR =Revised nonborrowed reserves, seasonally adjusted; in 
bill ions of dollars. Before November 1980, UR is the 
nonborrowed reserves of member banks; it is the 
nonborrowed reserves of depository institutions under 
the Monetary Control Act since November 1980. 
Source:·Federal Reserve Bulletin. 
UN= Unemployment rate for the civil ian labor force , 
seasonally adjusted; in percent. Source: Business 
Statistics. 
y =Real gross national product, seasonally adjusted; in 
billions of 1972 dollars.· Source: Business 
Statistics. 
P = lmpl icit price deflator for GNP; index number, 1972 = 
100. Source: Business Statistics. 
BP =Real balance on current account, seasonally adjusted; 
in billions of 1972 dollars. It is the sum of net 
exports of goods and services and net unilateral 
transfers to foreign countries excluding military 
grants of goods and services. Source: Business 
Statistics and Balance of Payments. 
=Three-month Treasury bill rate (open market rate on 
109 
new issues in New York city>; in percent per annum. 
Source: Business Statistics. 
110 
D1 = Dummy variable. It takes the value of 1 after 1969:4 
and zero otherwise. 
M =Revised money stock, Ml, seasonally adjusted; in 
bill ions of dollars. For 1953:1-1959:4, M equals 
total demand deposits adjusted (i.e., demand deposits 
other than interbank and U. S. government less cash 
items reported as in process of collection) plus 
currency (outside the Treasury, Federal Reserve 
Banks, and vaults of all commercial banks). For 
December 1979-December 1981, M is M1B. Source: 
Federal Reserve Bulletin. 
D2 = Dummy variable. It takes the value of 1 after 1979:3 
and zero otherwise. 
id =Discount rate of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York; 
in percent per annum. Source: Business Statistics. 
Z =Reserve requirement of reserve city bank, or the 
member bank reserve requirement of net demand 
deposits over $400 mill ion (since November 1972>; 
in percent of deposits. Demand deposits subject to 
reserve requirements are gross demand deposits minus 
cash items in process of collection and demand 
balances due from domestic banks. Source: Federal 
Reserve Bulletin. 
H =Ratio of currency held by the public to the money 
stock, seasonally adjusted. Source: Federal Reserve 
I 
1 1 1 
Bulletin and Business Statistics. 
03 = Dummy variable. It taKes the value of 1 after 1982:2 
and zero otherwise. 
r** =Long-term real Treasury pond rate <over 10 years); in 
percent per annum. It is obtained from equation 
(4.10). 
G = Real government purchases of goods and services, 
seasonally adjusted; in bill ions of 1972 dollars. 
Source: Business Statistics. 
TAX= Real net receipts of government, seasonally adjusted; 
in bill ions of 1972 dollars. It is adjusted for 
Federal grants-in-aid to state and local governments. 
Source: Business Statistics and Economic Report of the 
President. 
t = Time trend. 
i** =Long-term Treasury bond rate (over 10 years); in 
percent per annum. Source: Business Statistics. 
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